An attacker doesn't always need sophisticated malware or advanced hacking tools to gain access to an organization's most sensitive systems. Sometimes, all it takes is one compromised employee account and a weakness in how credentials are protected.
Kerberoasting exploits a legitimate function within Microsoft's Active Directory, allowing attackers to request encrypted authentication data that they can then attempt to crack offline to uncover service account passwords.
Because the initial requests can resemble normal network activity, the attack can be difficult to detect before more sensitive accounts are compromised.
With Active Directory widely used across corporate networks, Kerberoasting presents a significant security risk for organizations of all sizes. Threat groups such as FIN7 have used the technique in real-world attacks, demonstrating how legitimate authentication processes can be exploited to gain unauthorized access.
Understanding how Kerberoasting works, how it differs from other credential attacks, and what warning signs threat hunters should look for is an important step toward protecting Active Directory environments.
Kerberos is the system that Active Directory uses to check who you are and which lets you into company apps. Think of it like a theme park:
However, part of each ride ticket is locked using the app's own service account password. And the ticket booth gives a ticket to anyone wearing a wristband, without checking whether they are actually allowed on that ride. That check happens later, at the ride itself.
Kerberoasting abuses that open ticket booth, and the attacker first needs to be inside the network with any normal employee account, which is why it is described as an attack that happens after an initial break-in.
Once a password is cracked, the attacker can log in as that service account and use its access to dig deeper into the network. Free, widely available hacking tools automate the whole process.
The real weakness is not a software bug, but weak passwords on service accounts; computer accounts get long, random passwords that change automatically. Service accounts, though, are often set up by a person, given a password they can remember, and then left alone for years.
Old technology makes things worse, and many networks still allow an outdated lock on tickets called RC4, which is much faster to crack than the modern AES lock. Older accounts may not even support the newer lock until someone resets their password.
It is also hard to notice, for three reasons:
Kerberoasting belongs to a family of attacks that misuse Active Directory's login tickets. The table below puts the most common ones side by side.
|
Attack |
In plain terms |
What the attacker needs first |
What they end up with |
|
Kerberoasting |
Collects app tickets and cracks them offline |
Any normal employee account |
The password of a service account |
|
Grabs crackable login data from accounts with a key safety check switched off |
Often nothing beyond network access |
The password of a poorly configured user account |
|
|
Forges a fake ticket for one specific app |
A service account's password data |
Access to that one app, as any user |
|
|
Forges a fake "wristband" that works everywhere |
The master key of the whole login system |
Access to almost anything in the network |
|
|
Logs in with a stolen scrambled password instead of the real one |
Password data taken from a hacked computer |
Access as that user, without knowing the password |
Kerberoasting and AS-REP Roasting both end with offline password cracking, but Kerberoasting needs an existing foothold first. The attacks also chain together; a password cracked through Kerberoasting can be used to forge a Silver Ticket.
Since the cracking is invisible, hunters focus on the moment the attacker collects tickets. Windows keeps a record of every ticket request, noting who asked, which app it was for, and which type of lock was used. The first step is making sure that logging is actually switched on.
One of the most reliable tricks is a decoy: a fake service account that looks tempting but runs no real app. No legitimate user ever needs a ticket for it, so any request for one is almost certainly an attacker. Attack tools that grab tickets for every app will fall for it right away.
Some older apps still legitimately use the old RC4 lock, so they will look suspicious too. Microsoft publishes guidance on finding those apps, which helps hunters separate harmless legacy activity from real attacks.
You cannot stop employees from requesting tickets, so the goal is to make stolen tickets useless. The most effective steps are:
Kerberoasting lets an attacker turn one stolen employee account into the keys to much more powerful ones, quietly and without breaking anything. The good news is that it leaves clues when tickets are collected, and simple measures such as strong service account passwords, retiring RC4, and setting decoy accounts make it both easier to catch and far less likely to succeed.
The challenge with attacks like Kerberoasting is that malicious activity can blend into legitimate network operations, giving attackers opportunities to go unnoticed. Organizations that prioritize early threat detection and proactive security measures are better positioned to stop attacks before they escalate.
Strengthen your defenses with RADICL. Learn how our cybersecurity experts can help your organization identify emerging threats and respond before they become serious security incidents.