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Understanding Kerberoasting and Its Role in Active Directory Attacks

Written by Jordan Dean | Nov 18, 2026

An attacker doesn't always need sophisticated malware or advanced hacking tools to gain access to an organization's most sensitive systems. Sometimes, all it takes is one compromised employee account and a weakness in how credentials are protected.

Kerberoasting exploits a legitimate function within Microsoft's Active Directory, allowing attackers to request encrypted authentication data that they can then attempt to crack offline to uncover service account passwords.

Because the initial requests can resemble normal network activity, the attack can be difficult to detect before more sensitive accounts are compromised.

With Active Directory widely used across corporate networks, Kerberoasting presents a significant security risk for organizations of all sizes. Threat groups such as FIN7 have used the technique in real-world attacks, demonstrating how legitimate authentication processes can be exploited to gain unauthorized access.

Understanding how Kerberoasting works, how it differs from other credential attacks, and what warning signs threat hunters should look for is an important step toward protecting Active Directory environments.

What is Kerberos?

Kerberos is the system that Active Directory uses to check who you are and which lets you into company apps. Think of it like a theme park:

  • The wristband: when you log in each morning, a central server checks your password and gives you a digital wristband (technically a "ticket-granting ticket"). It proves you are a legitimate employee.
  • The ride ticket: when you want to use a specific app, such as a database or the payroll system, you show your wristband and get a ticket for that one app (a "service ticket").
  • The ride's name tag: each app has a unique label so the system knows which ticket to issue. Behind each label is a "service account", which is the account the app runs under.

However, part of each ride ticket is locked using the app's own service account password. And the ticket booth gives a ticket to anyone wearing a wristband, without checking whether they are actually allowed on that ride. That check happens later, at the ride itself.

How the attack works, step by step

Kerberoasting abuses that open ticket booth, and the attacker first needs to be inside the network with any normal employee account, which is why it is described as an attack that happens after an initial break-in.

  1. Get in: the attacker takes over one ordinary account, for example through a phishing email or a guessed password.
  2. Make a list of apps: using that account, they look up which apps run under service accounts. These accounts often have far more access than they need.
  3. Collect tickets: they request a ticket for each app, and the system hands them over, because asking for tickets is completely normal.
  4. Crack them at home: they copy the tickets to their own computer and try millions of password guesses until one unlocks a ticket. Because this happens off the network, no failed logins appear and no accounts get locked.

Once a password is cracked, the attacker can log in as that service account and use its access to dig deeper into the network. Free, widely available hacking tools automate the whole process.

Why it works so well

The real weakness is not a software bug, but weak passwords on service accounts; computer accounts get long, random passwords that change automatically. Service accounts, though, are often set up by a person, given a password they can remember, and then left alone for years.

Old technology makes things worse, and many networks still allow an outdated lock on tickets called RC4, which is much faster to crack than the modern AES lock. Older accounts may not even support the newer lock until someone resets their password.

It is also hard to notice, for three reasons:

  • It looks like normal activity. The network sees an ordinary ticket request, not a failed login or a blocked attempt.
  • The cracking happens elsewhere. Password guessing takes place on the attacker's own machine, so defenders have to catch the ticket requests instead.
  • The records may not exist. Ticket requests are only logged if a specific auditing setting is turned on.

How Kerberoasting compares with similar attacks

Kerberoasting belongs to a family of attacks that misuse Active Directory's login tickets. The table below puts the most common ones side by side.

Attack

In plain terms

What the attacker needs first

What they end up with

Kerberoasting

Collects app tickets and cracks them offline

Any normal employee account

The password of a service account

AS-REP Roasting

Grabs crackable login data from accounts with a key safety check switched off

Often nothing beyond network access

The password of a poorly configured user account

Silver Ticket

Forges a fake ticket for one specific app

A service account's password data

Access to that one app, as any user

Golden Ticket

Forges a fake "wristband" that works everywhere

The master key of the whole login system

Access to almost anything in the network

Pass-the-Hash

Logs in with a stolen scrambled password instead of the real one

Password data taken from a hacked computer

Access as that user, without knowing the password

 

Kerberoasting and AS-REP Roasting both end with offline password cracking, but Kerberoasting needs an existing foothold first. The attacks also chain together; a password cracked through Kerberoasting can be used to forge a Silver Ticket.

How threat hunters catch it

Since the cracking is invisible, hunters focus on the moment the attacker collects tickets. Windows keeps a record of every ticket request, noting who asked, which app it was for, and which type of lock was used. The first step is making sure that logging is actually switched on.

Warning signs to look for

  • Old locks where new ones are expected. Modern computers normally ask for tickets with the newer AES lock. A regular employee account asking for tickets with the old RC4 lock is suspicious, because attackers choose it to make cracking faster.
  • Too many tickets at once. A real employee uses a handful of apps; one account requesting tickets for dozens of apps in a few minutes stands out.
  • Unfamiliar combinations. A person suddenly requesting tickets for an app they have never used before is worth looking into, and one published detection compares each request against the previous seven days.
  • Snooping beforehand. Searches that list all service accounts often come just before the ticket grab.

Set a trap

One of the most reliable tricks is a decoy: a fake service account that looks tempting but runs no real app. No legitimate user ever needs a ticket for it, so any request for one is almost certainly an attacker. Attack tools that grab tickets for every app will fall for it right away.

Watch out for false alarms

Some older apps still legitimately use the old RC4 lock, so they will look suspicious too. Microsoft publishes guidance on finding those apps, which helps hunters separate harmless legacy activity from real attacks.

How to make Kerberoasting less effective

You cannot stop employees from requesting tickets, so the goal is to make stolen tickets useless. The most effective steps are:

  • Use strong, automatic passwords. Microsoft offers special service accounts (Group Managed Service Accounts) that set and rotate long, random passwords on their own. Where that is not possible, use a very long, unique password and change it regularly.
  • Retire the old RC4 lock. Turning off RC4 is one of the strongest defenses. Microsoft is phasing it out in 2026, and resetting an old account's password lets it start using the newer lock.
  • Give service accounts only the access they need. Remove ones that are no longer used and keep them out of top-level admin groups.
  • Keep the records. Make sure ticket requests are logged and sent to your security monitoring tools.

Kerberoasting lets an attacker turn one stolen employee account into the keys to much more powerful ones, quietly and without breaking anything. The good news is that it leaves clues when tickets are collected, and simple measures such as strong service account passwords, retiring RC4, and setting decoy accounts make it both easier to catch and far less likely to succeed.

The challenge with attacks like Kerberoasting is that malicious activity can blend into legitimate network operations, giving attackers opportunities to go unnoticed. Organizations that prioritize early threat detection and proactive security measures are better positioned to stop attacks before they escalate.

Strengthen your defenses with RADICL. Learn how our cybersecurity experts can help your organization identify emerging threats and respond before they become serious security incidents.